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Post Bellum Aspects of the Laws of
Armed Conflict
JEREMY WALDRON*
I. INTRODUCTION
§ 1. In recent years, theorists of international law have revived
an interest in jus post bellum as one of the bodies of law that are
supposed to regulate armed conflict.1 We now have jus ad bellum,
governing the just grounds for making war, the occasions on which
war may be made, the entities that make war, and the formalities
by which war may be initiated.2 Jus ad bellum includes, inter alia,
the principles prohibiting aggressive war and defining self-defense,
and the rules requiring international authorization and specific
declarations. We also have jus in bello, which governs the behavior
that may be engaged in during the course of war: this includes
laws prohibiting the targeting of civilians; laws that require armed
forces to offer quarter and accept individual and unit surrenders;
laws that govern the treatment of prisoners of war and other
detainees; and laws and principles that regulate plunder, booty,
and the targeting and destruction of civilian and economic
infrastructure.3 Now, a third body of law has emerged-jus post
bellum-a body of law that is supposed to regulate occupation,
reparations, the dismantling of aggressive regimes, re-formation of
belligerent nations, treaties of peace subsequent to war, and so
4on.
§ 2. I said that this is a revival, for the study of jus post bellum
was characteristic of natural lawyers and early international
lawyers. For example, Alberico Gentili devoted the third book of
Jeremy Waldron is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the New York University
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR (Yale Univ. Press 2005).
2. See also id. at xiii.
3. See also id. at xiii, 161.
4. See also id.
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his treatise De Jure Belli Libri Tres,5 first published in 1598, to the
law of victory and the law of peace, with chapter titles such as "Of
the Vengeance of the Victor," "On Exacting Tribute and Lands
from the Vanquished," "On Ensuring Peace for the Future," and
"Whether it is Right to Make a Treaty with Men of a Different
Religion."6 Nearly two centuries later, Emer de Vattel devoted an
entire book of his treatise The Laws of Nations to the topic "Of
the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies" 7 which followed
Book III, entitled "Of War."8 Book III also included chapters on
truces, the ransom of prisoners, post-liminium, and conquest.9
§ 3. In these early treatises and among contemporaries, each
of the three bodies of law-jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post
bellum-were presented as positive law, constituted, in part, by the
treaties and conventions of the international community and in
part, by the law of nations (jus gentium). Associated with this,
there is in each case also a body of jurisprudence, i.e., a set of
principles and fairly abstract doctrine, and behind that, in turn, we
find a body of philosophical thought about the various topics that
these three bodies of law address. 10
The background philosophy is taken quite seriously in the
jurisprudence of the law of armed conflict, and the jurisprudence is
taken quite seriously in articulations of the applicable positive law.
This is partly because of the thoughtfulness and theoretical
interests of international lawyers, which distinguishes them from
many other types of lawyers. It is partly because some of their
doctrines give philosophical jurisprudence a prominent part to
play as actual sources of law (as in opinio juris in relation to
customary international law and as in the role of natural law
thinking in the discernment, articulation, and elaboration of the jus
5. ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND
PEACE: THREE BOOKS] (1612) reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Div. Int'l Law, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Publ'n No. 16, James Brown Scott
ed., John C. Rolfe trans., Clarendon Press 1933).
6. Id. at 473, 493, 576, 649.
7. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied
to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns Book IV, 429-506 (Joseph Chitty
ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1883).
8. Id. at Book III, 291-428.
9. Id.
10. For the distinction between law and morality, see Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of
Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 729 n.33 (2004). See also infra § 8.
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gentium). " It is also partly because the law's standing in the midst
of armed conflict is precarious and constantly subject to political
challenge, compelling international lawyers involved in the law of
war to be especially self-conscious and reflective when articulating
legal standards to regulate armed conflict and when figuring what
the sources of such standards may be. 1 Constantly on the defense
against international law skepticism, lawyers and jurists in this
field repeatedly have to revert to first principles in their structural,
formal, and substantive thinking. And while international law
skepticism is probably not a good thing, this side effect of it
certainly is.
§ 4. In this article, I want to consider some hypotheses about
the relationship between jus post bellum and the other two bodies
of law that constitute the law of armed conflict.
I am assuming that it is a good idea to have an integrated
theory of the various aspects of the law of armed conflict, but
certain connections must be carefully considered. For example, it
has usually been thought-and I believe quite properly-that jus
in bello should operate independently from jus ad bellum. 13 By this
I mean that the rights, protections, duties, and responsibilities of
soldiers should be the same whether they are engaged in a just war
(from a jus ad bellum point of view) or not. 1" So for example, the
principle that quarter may in no circumstances be denied should
apply to the benefit of soldiers fighting an unjust war as much as to
soldiers fighting a just war. One reason for this is that no country
ever fights with an open acknowledgment that its own cause is
unjust, and few countries fight without an insistence that their
opponent's cause is unjust. 15 It is important to avoid the situation
in which the official position of both sides commits each to the
11. I have discussed this a little in Jeremy Waldron, Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law,
Ius Gentium: A Defense of Gentili's Equation of the Law of Nature and the Law of
Nations, Address at Commemorative Alberico Gentili Conference (Mar. 15, 2008)
(transcript on file with author).
12. Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Understanding the Regulation
of Collective Violence in Criminal Law and the Law of War, 11-12 (Boalt Working Papers
in Public Law, Paper No. 122, 2004), available at
http://works.bepress.com/christopher-kutz/4.
13. For a discussion on the separation of these two theories, see Kutz, supra note 12;
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (Basic Books 2006), available at
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280897 [hereinafter WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST
WARS].
14. See the brief discussion in WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 13, at
124.
15. Kutz, supra note 12.
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view that they are not bound by the rules of jus in bello in their
treatment of their opponents.
Some philosophers have contested this idea. Chris Kutz, for
example, has argued that soldiers fighting what they know is an
unjust war should not be thought to have a privilege to kill soldiers
who have justice on their side. 16 He suggests-if I remember his
argument correctly-that a determination that the former's cause
is unjust must yield a conclusion that they are not entitled to kill
anyone in pursuit of it. "
I do not find that persuasive. But even if one were persuaded
by Kutz's argument, it might still be prudent to develop an
integrated account of the laws relating to the initiation, conduct,
and conclusion of armed conflict. But we should leave open the
possibility that such integration includes an explanation of why it is
important to establish certain firewalls between the various aspects
of just war theory.
§ 5. In this article, I shall consider a couple of suggestions
regarding the relationship between jus post bellum and other
aspects of the laws of armed conflict.
In §§ 6-11, I shall consider and express some doubts about a
hypothesis put forward by Michael Walzer on this subject. Walzer
believes that the best account of some of the central doctrines of
jus in bello is that they look forward to the viability of the situation
post bellum: we refrain from killing civilians because there must
be a people to make peace and prosper with after the cessation of
hostilities. I shall contrast Walzer's position with a position taken
by Jeff McMahan, which does not move from jus in bello to jus
post bellum in this way.
In §§ 12-19, I shall consider a more ambitious hypothesis put
forward by Oliver O'Donovan about the connection between jus
post bellum, on the one hand, and jus ad bellum and jus in bello, on
the other hand. O'Donovan shares some of Walzer's concerns. But
O'Donovan also believes that the three aspects of just war theory
are united by a central concept of judgment, as something which
16. Id. at 13. See also McMahan supra note 10, at 702.
17. This need not involve a wholesale abrogation of jus in bello. There might be a
compromise position: the protections of jus in bello do not cease to apply-soldiers
fighting in an unjust war may not be denied quarter nor massacred once they have been
captured-but some of. the privileges of jus in bello do not apply to soldiers in an unjust
war.
[Vol. 31:31
Post Bellum Aspects
distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate war-making and war-
related activities at every stage of the process.
Neither of these hypotheses tells us much about occupation as
a specific topic in jus post bellum, 8 although I think that
O'Donovan's framework does have serious implications-negative
implications-for the kind of War-making that envisages
occupation of the home territory of an adversary nation as a likely
end to a just war.
On a wider front, O'Donovan points us towards an
understanding of the continuity between the theory of jus post
bellum (especially the law regarding the establishment of peace
and normality in the wake of war) and political theory.19 If, for any
reason, a victor state in a just war is to remain as an occupier of
enemy territory for more than a very short period after the end of
hostilities, the obvious priority is to establish some form of
ordinary and minimally legitimate rule in the territory. No doubt
such rule will eventually come under pressure from the principle of
self-determination. But it would be wrong to think that there is no
criterion of minimally good government apart from self-
determination. Since the time of John Locke, political
philosophers have understood that the fact that a political system
has its historic roots in conquest does not affect the main
constraints that it is under, as far as respect for person, liberty,
property and the general welfare is concerned. 20 Nor, does it affect
the regime's affirmative responsibilities of good government.
O'Donovan's account, we shall see, has the advantage of
understanding and embracing this continuity. 21
18. As I understand it, occupation was the specific topic of this symposium.
19. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED 109-123 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2003) [hereinafter O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED].
20. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 16 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
21. For an essay considering Walzer and O'Donovan's work together with respect to
the themes addressed here, see Daniel Bell, Just War Engaged: Review Essay of Walzer
and O'Donovan, 22 MODERN THEOLOGY 295 (2006).
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II. WALZER 21
§ 6. Like many theorists of the laws of armed conflict, Walzer
has struggled to understand the leading principle of jus in bello,
viz. the principle of civilian immunity. 23 The principle of civilian
immunity (sometimes called "the principle of discrimination")
requires those engaged in armed conflict to discriminate between
civilian and military targets and to refrain from delibdrately
attempting to kill or wound civilians.24 The term "innocent
civilians" is sometimes used, but unless "innocent" is understood
in a strictly technical sense, the phrase is largely unhelpful. 25 When
we fight a just war, we may suppose that the soldiers fighting
against us are not innocent, in the sense that they are using deadly
force to advance unjust aggression or injustice. But if the soldiers
are fighting for an unjust cause, it is likely that the civilian
leadership of their country set them on this course. Thus, many
civilians are at least as guilty as their leadership, perhaps even
more so, inasmuch as the civilians have choices which traditional
accounts of the legitimate relation between civilian and military
authorities deny to the latter. 26 And, if the civilian leaders are .not
innocent, in any moral sense, than no doubt the same is true of
many of their supporters among the ordinary population. Yet, the
traditional principle of discrimination requires us to refrain from
targeting civilian supporters of the unjust war and maybe the
civilian leadership as well. 27
§ 7. Some philosophers have argued, on these same grounds,
that we should alter our understanding of the principle of
discrimination.28 In The Ethics of Killing in War,29 Jeff McMahan
argues that there is no moral justification for any absolute
22. Some of what follows is an adaptation and expansion of my review of Walzer's
book. Jeremy Waldron, When Is It Right to Invade?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Mar. 6, 2008. I have also drawn on an unpublished paper of mine. Jeremy Waldron,
Civilians, Terrorism, and Deadly Serious Conventions (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law &
Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-09, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346360.
23. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, supra note 13, at ch. 9.
24. McMahan supra note 10, at 725.
25. Id. at 695; Uwe Reinhardt, Innocents in Uniform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at
All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/22/opinionlinnocents-in-uniform.html.
26. McMahan supra note 10, at 726-27.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 726-30.
29. Id.
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prohibition on intentionally attacking civilians.3' He thinks a moral
case can be made for holding certain civilians liable to intentional
attack.3" Civilians who share responsibility for an unjust war, for
example, may be held liable to intentional attack. "It is moral
responsibility for an unjust threat," writes McMahan, "that is the
principal basis of liability to [be the target] of defensive (or
preservative) force." 1
2
The requirement of discrimination should then hold that
combatants must discriminate between those who are morally
responsible for an unjust threat, or for a grievance that provides
a just cause [for war], and those who are not. It should state that
while it is permissible to attack the former, it is not permissible
intentionally to attack the latter .... "
According to McMahan, legitimate war-making requires a
principle of discrimination. 4 But he does not think that morality
can support the particular discrimination that results from the
traditional principle of discrimination versus discrimination that
would inevitably follow from McMahan's own account in terms of
responsibility for the injustice that led to war in the first place."
§ 8. Having said that, however, McMahan is careful to insist
that the discussion quoted above proceeds at the level of
philosophical justification-what he calls "the deep morality of
war."36 He acknowledges that it would be a further step to argue
that the laws of war should be reformed in accordance with his
proposal.37
The formulation of the laws of war is a wholly different task,
one that I have not attempted and that has to be carried out
with a. view to the consequences of the adoption and
enforcement of the laws or conventions. It is, indeed, entirely
clear that the laws of war must diverge significantly from the
deep morality of war as I have presented it.
Targeted assassinations of rogue political leaders might come to
seem permissible. But we might be reluctant to embark on the
30. Id. at 723.
31. Id. at 726-30.
32. Id. at 722.
33. Id. at 722-23.
34. Id. at 694.
35. Id. at 719.
36. Id. at 730-31.
37. Id. at 731.
38. Id. at 730.
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wholesale reconstruction of the principle of discrimination as a
legal principle. "[T]he laws of war," writes McMahan, "... are
conventions established to mitigate the savagery of war." 39 Their
value in that regard is not exhausted by their ability to track the
principle of responsibility; a principle that guides McMahan's own
deep moral account of the difference between legitimate and
illegitimate targets. ' It is not my intention to distort McMahan's
approach, but I am going to focus more or less exclusively on what
he suggests is the importance of legal conventions. Furthermore,
my aim here is not to evaluate McMahan's overall position in any
detail. The purpose is to explore a contrast between McMahan's
and Michael Walzer's views regarding the general background
value of the convention that protects civilians from attack.41
§ 9. It is unclear whether Walzer would agree with
McMahan's deep moral critique of the principle of
discrimination.42 But interestingly, Walzer offers a different
account of the general background value informing the use of the
43legal principle of discrimination as a jus in bello convention.
While McMahan understands the background value as being
oriented to the character of warfare itself, - as being oriented
towards a mitigation of its savagery "--Walzer argues that the
background value has to do with the postwar situation.45 It is a
general value associated with jus post bellum rather than jus in
bello.46 Walzer states:
Implicit in the theory of just war is a theory of just peace:
whatever happens to these two armies, whichever one wins or
loses, whatever the nature of the battles, or the extent of the
casualties, the "peoples" on both sides must be accommodated
at the end. The central principle of jus in bello, that civilians
39. Id. at 730.
40. Id. at 721-22.
41. A more comprehensive discussion of McMahan's position would not lose sight of
the dissonance between the detailed deep moral critique of the principle of discrimination
and his general defense of it as a legal convention. By dissonance, I do not mean
inconsistency; all I mean is that McMahan hopes that we could eventually develop new
conventions truer to his deep moral account, which might serve the background value as
well as the present (morally flawed) convention.
42. McMahan, supra note 10, at 718-29.
43. MICHAEL WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY
266 (2007).
44. McMahan, supra note 10, at 730.
45. WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY, supra note 43, at 266.
46. For a general discussion of Walzer on jus post bellum, see Bell, supra note 21, at
298-300.
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can't be targeted or deliberately killed, means that they will be-
morally speaking, they have to be-present at the conclusion.
This is the deepest meaning of noncombatant immunity: it
doesn't only protect individual noncombatants; it also protects
the group to which they belong. ,
Both accounts can differentiate between small-scale
reformations of the principle of discrimination (that would allow
targeted assassination) and large-scale reformations that would
pose a wholesale threat to background values. Both have in mind
and both recoil from the prospect of making general large-scale
military attacks on civilian populations legitimate as part .of just-
war-making, even in cases where some responsibility for crimes
against peace and for the initiation and continuation of unjust
aggression can plausibly be attributed to the civilian populations
en masse and not just to one or two individuals among them.4' I
believe that both theorists want to hold on to the condemnation of
area bombing of civilian cities-like those directed against
Japanese and German cities in the Second World War-and also
to the condemnation of the use of weapons of mass destruction,
such as nuclear weapons. They want to hold on to the legal
conventions that stand between us and the horrific scale of death
and destruction that these activities involve.
But, as we have seen, each theorist gives, a different reason for
doing so. For McMahan, the horrors themselves at the time they
happen are what should give us pause; we should not lightly
abandon conventions that offer a good chance of mitigating the
immediate savagery of war. For Walzer, the point of sticking with
these conventions is not to mitigate the horror of war itself, but to
improve the character of the peace that we anticipate will
eventually ensue. For McMahan, the jus in bello convention is
oriented to an in bello objective; for Walzer the jus in bello
convention is oriented to a post bellum objective.
§ 10. Here's another way of seeing the difference: Walzer's
account is oriented ultimately to the continuing value of life,
whereas McMahan's account is riveted by the immediate horror of
killing.
Let me back up a little. We are talking about a convention
that confers immunity upon civilians from the sort of attacks that
soldiers may legitimately mount against each others' lives. It is
47.. WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY, supra note 43, at 266:
48. Id. at 300-01.
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tempting to see civilian immunity as a sort of exception from a
principle of legitimate wholesale slaughter that is typically
characteristic of war. But that is amistake. It is the soldier's right
to attack other soldiers that is the exception. It is an exception to
the all-important moral principle that in general, no one may
deliberately attack another's life. In general, all such attacks count
as murder or attempted murder. The soldier's right to use deadly
force against other soldiers is a specially granted (Hohfeldian)
privilege. He has permission to do what would otherwise count as
murder, so long as he is only trying to kill other soldiers. In this
light, the principle of civilian immunity is not an exception to the
soldier's privilege, but a recognition of its limits. Civilians are not
to be attacked because in general, no one is to be attacked.
Civilians are not to be killed because, in general, murder is wrong.
That is the default position. And combat of soldier upon soldier is
the only exception, allowed in the laws of war. "
We can restate McMahan's and Walzer's positions in the light
of this point; both are concerned about what would happen if the
general prohibition on homicide were relaxed in the context of war
more than it is already. McMahan's point is that the savagery of
war would be greatly enhanced if we were to relax the convention
that protects civilians. Without an adequately worked out
substitute, war would become in effect more murderous (in a loose
informal sense of "murderous") than it already is, because we
would have greatly expanded the conditions under what was
previously murder was now treated as justifiable homicide.
Walzer's point would be that, if this convention were relaxed,
there would be fewer lives left to be lived at the end of hostilities -
and that in and of itself would be a bad thing, quite apart from the
savage murderousness of the way those lives were taken.
It's a bit like the difference between teleological and
deontological accounts of the rule against killing. Some people see
the rule against killing as a simple side-constraint on certain sorts
of intentional actions. Others see it in a more teleological light:
trying not to cause deaths, trying to keep as many people as
possible alive. In most situations, the two coincide: one of the
greatest contributions we can make to keeping as many people as
49. Not exactly the only exception. You can shoot spies and civilians bearing arms.
And you can attack military targets in a way that may endanger civilian lives with the
foresight or recklessness to know that there will be civilian casualties that may be
considered murderous in ordinary peace-time circumstances.
[Vol. 31:31
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possible alive is to not intentionally kill anyone. But sometimes
they come apart, as the famous trolley problem illustrates.5" The
analogy is not perfect, but I hope it casts some light on the
difference between the kind of rationale for the convention
prohibiting attacks on civilians that McMahan offers and the kind
of rationale for the convention that Walzer offers.
§ 11. Both sets of considerations are surely important and it is
not my intention to suggest there is nothing to the connection that
Walzer sees between jus in bello and post bellum. I think, however,
McMahan's account is preferable. Although he would surely
distinguish between a deep deontological rationale for the
convention that prohibits attacks on civilians and the value that
that convention upholds, I think he would say that our account of
the latter must be true to the way the convention operates. The
convention operates as though it were a deontological side-
constraint: no civilian is to be attacked, even if (in some weird
Kamm-like example) this would make it more likely that more
lives would thrive in the post bellum phase. If McMahan is right in
the critique noted in § 6, then there is nothing deeply
deontological justifying the content of the surface deontology of
the convention as it is presently formulated. But still, the value of
mitigating the immediate savagery of war offers a better account
of the surface deontology of is operation than Walzer's more
teleological account.
III. O'DONOVAN
§ 12. Oliver O'Donoan's books on political judgment and
just war are among the more interesting and original bodies of
work to emerge in political philosophy in recent decades. " But it is
not easy to bring them into direct relation and comparison with
other works in political philosophy.
O'Donovan is an Anglican theologian, perhaps the most
prominent of modern-day political theologians.52 The Christian
50. Francis Myrna Kamm, Harming Some to Save Others, 57 PHIL. STUD. 227-60
(1989).
51. See, e.g., OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT (William B.
Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 2005) [hereinafter O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT];
OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
[hereinafter O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS]; O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR
REVISITED, supra note 19.
52. He is Professor of Christian Ethics and Practical Theology at the University of
Edinburgh and formerly Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at Oxford. The
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substance of his work consists of much more than a few quotations
from scripture or an occasional exhortation on Christian values.
O'Donovan believes that there is a radical discontinuity of
normative foundation between the political formations of antiquity
(of the Greek city states, or ancient Israel, or Rome) and the
political formations set up in the last two millennia. 53 Law, politics,
and the state, he maintains, have to be understood in a wholly
different way in the light of the resurrection and exaltation of
Jesus Christ. " The detailed differences cannot be explored here,
but the most important of them is that life on earth is no longer to
be regarded as the summum bonum and the state is not to proceed
as though it were. And as for the pursuit of the good life, that is
now dealt directly by an authority higher than the state and by a
separate set of institutions (the church or churches) set up by this
higher authority. 55
The task remaining to political authority is simply the
provisional doing of justice on earth in the time that is left to us
before the final judgment of God in the world. 6 O'Donovan's
thesis is that the authority of government is to be devoted to what
he calls "judgment"-the upholding and vindicating right against
wrong, just against unjust, in a world where many wrong and
unjust actions are performed and wrong and unjust situations exist,
and in respect of what it is morally necessary that right and justice
be humanly vindicated.57 Even apart from the disconcerting
theological context, O'Donovan's position sounds conservative,
for it seems to imply that all sorts of things that the government
used to do or might be imagined to do are now no longer its
concern.58 O'Donovan actually seems to want to resist this
impression. He writes that his account does not imply that,
[T]he whole operation of government is thinned down, as in
some libertarian fantasy, to the operation of civil courts of
University of Edinburgh, School of Divinity New College, Prof. Oliver O'Donovan,
http://www.div.ed~ac.uk/donovan (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
53. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 127.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 3-12.
56. See id. at 5.
57. See id. at 3-12.
58. "Other tasks that government might perform, and in ancient Israel did
perform,.., could have no interest in a world where God had conferred his sovereignty
upon his Christ. The higher goods of mankind's social destiny have been looked after in
the proclamation of Christ; only the lower goods of judgment need concern earthly
princes." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 31:31
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justice; it means that political authority in all its forms-
lawmaking, war-making, welfare provision, education-is to be
reconceived within this matrix and subject to the discipline of
enacting right against wrong.59
And a large part of his most recent book, Ways of Judgment, is
devoted to reconceptualizing the traditional tasks of government
along these lines.' Like the theology, the broader political
philosophy does not concern us here. What does concern us is that
O'Donovan wants to understand the waging of a just war in this
light as well: to wage war justly is to use armed force to uphold the
right and the just against the unjust or wrongful; it is to enter
judgment forcibly and under arms in circumstances where
institutions that might do justice properly are as a matter of fact,
unavailable I think we should be interested in the implications that
this reconceptualization of just-war-making has on the connection
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, on the one hand, and jus
post bellum, on the other.
The remainder of this article will proceed as follows: after
one or two more preliminary comments in §§ 13-14, I will state the
core of O'Donovan's position about war and judgment in § 15 and
then focus § 16 on the aspect of his conception of judgment that
seems most promising for the connection that interests us. The
connection itself will be explored in § 17, and its application to
various post bellum issues will be considered in §§ 18-19.
§ 13. Our discussion of O'Donovan's view of the relation
between jus ad bellum and jus post bellum is complicated in the
first instance by his discomfort with the traditional division of the
laws of armed conflict into these categories. He denies that the
traditional distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is (as
he puts it) "a load-bearing distinction. '' 6' The latter distinction
conveys a sense that there is an isolable moment of going to war,
59. Id. at 4-5.
60. See id. at chs. 3-4.
61. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 15. O'Donovan also says,
of the Thomistic approach to these distinctions, with requirements or principles arrayed in
lists under each heading: "Such attempts to reclaim the tradition have a disconcertingly
legalist feel to them, ticking off the principles, as it were, one by one. But the train of
thought involved in exploring judgment in armed combat is not reducible to a list" Id. at
14.
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which determines whether or not a war is just and at that point,
there is the separate issue of whether war is being waged justly. 62
Major historical events cannot be justified or criticized in one
mouthful; they are concatenations and agglomerations of many
separate actions and many varied results. One may justify or
criticize acts of statesmen, acts of generals, acts of common
soldiers or of civilians... but wars as such, like most large-scale
historical phenomena, present only a great question mark, a
continual invitation to reflect further on which decisions were,
and which were not, justified at the time and in the
circumstances. 63
Also, with regard to the specific issue that interests us-jus post
bellum-O'Donovan observes that, just as we cannot mark a
bright line where "moral rules 'towards' war end and moral rules
'in' war take over," we should also not insist on being able to know
too precisely where war ends and peace begins (and jus post
bellum "kicks in"). ' This last point seems particularly important in
our discussion about occupation and continuing insurgency even
after "mission accomplished" has been declared.
Although this seems to complicate our task, it will in fact help
since the thesis of O'Donovan's that we want to explore is his
overarching framework-war as armed judgment. This means that
decisions made at or near the beginning of a war, as much as
decisions made at or near its ending, have to be oriented to
decisions faced (sometimes long after) after hostilities have ceased.
§ 14. In one respect, O'Donovan's position is like the position
of Walzer that was considered in § 9. Walzer defended the
principle that protects civilians on the ground that the life of
people (even an unjust enemy people) must be permitted to go on
after hostilities have ended. 6 O'Donovan says something similar
about the rules in bello that protect civilian infrastructure:
If we were to deny our enemy the power to produce food, if we
were to terrorize his marketplaces or flatten his residential
suburbs, we might quite properly hamper his ability to pursue
his wicked purposes against us; but such a route to victory is
one we should deny ourselves, since it denies the right of
62. See also O'Donovan's subtle and useful discussion of the responsible decision-
making of ordinary soldiers. Id. at 16-17.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 16.
65. WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY, supra note 43, at 266.
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peaceful social existence, a right in which we and our enemy
both share. 6
I suspect it is more plausible to parse the rule protecting civilian
infrastructure in this way, than it is to offer a similar parsing of the
rule protecting civilian lives. Protecting civilian infrastructure does
naturally have the sort of teleological aspect that was worried
about (§§ 10-11) in the case of Walzer's account of the civilian
right not to be killed.
§ 15. I have said that the key to Oliver O'Donovan's position
on just-war-making is the idea of armed judgment, the forceful
doing of justice.67 O'Donovan takes his inspiration from the
position of sixteenth century thinkers like Francisco Suarez, who
said of war, "the only reason for it is that an act of punitive justice
is indispensable to mankind, and that no more fitting means for it
is forthcoming within the limits of nature and human action."68
Suarez puts greater emphasis on the punitive aspect of
judgment than O'Donovan does.69 O'Donovan's conception of
judgment, though it is supposed to be reactive in the sense of
responding to something wrong or unjust that has happened, is
more expansive and besides punishment, includes ideas about the
vindication of property, territory or other wrongly abrogated
rights, demands for return or reparation, the resolution of
disputes, and so on.70 Judgment may be simply like President
Bush's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait-"It won't
stand" 7 -though it is important to understand that judgment, for
66. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 39-40. See also
O'Donovan's discussion of Deuteronomy 20:19. Id. at 41-42.
67. See O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 5i, at 3-12.
68. Id. at 225; O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 18.
69. See also Benedict Kingsbury & Alexis Blane, Punishment and the Ius Post
Bellum, Paper Presented at Commemorative Alberico Gentili Conference (Mar. 14, 2008).
See, e.g., FRANCISCO SUAREZ, THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTIONS
FROM THREE WORKS 253-57 (1964).
70. See O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 53. On the other hand,
he does say that a penal element is necessary. Id. For the broader aspects of judgment in
O'Donovan's political theory, see O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note
51, at chs. 3-4. In that account judgment can include legislative interventions, as well as
various governmental social programs such as remedying past discrimination. See id. at 8-
9,62.
71. Excerpts of News Conference by Bush on Budget and Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1990, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08115/us/excerpts-of-news-
conference-by-bush-on-budget-and-gulf.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all ("But I know
that annexation, if this is what one calls this invasion of Kuwait, is unacceptable. And that
is-it won't stand.")
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O'Donovan, is emphatically not just a matter of words or
rhetoric. 72
Punitive or not, the key to Suarez's position and O'Donovan's
is that an act of justice is necessary and "no more fitting means for
it is forthcoming."73 Generally, in political theory we seek to
establish institutions that will take responsibility for the doing of
justice." But in the case of injustice among nations or
communities, such institutions may be non-existent or inadequate.
Therefore, individual nations and coalitions must take informal
responsibility for doing justice when justice is necessary.
What distinguishes the justified resort to armed conflict is the
unavailability of ordinary means of judgement. Justice in war
[stands] in relation to the exercise of domestic justice as an
emergency operation, performed in a remote mountain-hut
with a pen-knife stands to the same surgery performed under
clinical conditions in a hospital. The reason for carrying the
practice outside the ordinary institutions of government is
simply the emergency .... Judgment in armed conflict is
extraordinary, an adventure beyond the ordinary reach of law
and order, hazarded upon God's providential provision."
Although war-making steps are outside the ordinary institutional
context of judgment, O'Donovan's account still "affirms the logic
of judgment by which such improvised action is disciplined. ' 76 A
nation making war justly is "supposed to venture informally and
with extraordinary means, the judgment that would be made by a
formal court, if there were a competent one." 
77
War may seem to be simply a duel, unmediated by judgment-
giving authority. Or, at its most just, it may seem to be a matter of
unmediated though justifiable self-defense. But O'Donovan rejects
both these images. He rejects the image of the duel: "no Christian
believes that opposition can in fact be unmediated." 78 More subtly,
he insists on the element of judgment even in the situation of self-
defense:
72. To expand this, we should have to venture into the vexed territory of the relation
between O'Donovan's view of war and Christian pacifism, non-violence, and martyrdom.
See O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 7-11.
73. Id. at 225.
74. See, e.g., O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 3-12.
75. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 18-19.
76. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 225.
77. Id. at 23; O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 23 (emphasis
added).
78. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 2.
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In a state of war we face a threat which it falls outside the
competence of any judiciary to control; the responsibility for
improvising judgment falls back upon the first power of
government. As in an emergency when a police officer
confronts an armed and dangerous criminal, the situation is
formally a duel, yet morally the triangular relation of judge to
victim and assailant dictates the permissions that govern the
proceedings.79
In fact, the international arena is not utterly bereft of
institutions that can provide some real mediation for judgment in
the face of armed injustice. O'Donovan devotes some interesting
discussion to the importance of the UN Security Council and its
claim to have the sole right to authorize armed force. against
sovereign states other than that required for immediate self-
defense. 80 For all its inadequacies, he believes that the existence of
this framework casts a much greater burden of poof on any
country purporting to make war in the name of justice unilaterally
(using the Suarez formula).8"
§ 16. What is judgment or the doing of justice according to
O'Donovan? He proposes the following working definition:
"judgment is an act of moral discrimination that pronounces upon
a preceding act or existing state of affairs to establish a new public
context."82 It has a backward-looking aspect inasmuch as it
pronounces on some action that has taken place or on some
existing state of affairs. It has a moral aspect inasmuch as it seeks
to vindicate an objective standard of justice or right. And it has a
forward-looking aspect, which, for our purposes in this article, is
the most important. Judgment, he says,
[E]stablishes a public context, a practical context... in which
succeeding acts, private or public, may be performed. The fact
that an act must be by definition retrospective [as judgment
must be] does not mean that it must be undertaken without a
prospective object .... The prospective object of the act of
judgment is the securing of a public moral context, the good
79. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 225.
80. See O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 24-25, 54. See also the
discussion of the Security Council crisis in relation to the American-led invasion of Iraq in
2003. Id. at 124-136.
81. Id. at 25.
82. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 7 (emphasis in
original).
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order within which we may act and interact as members of a
community.
An act of judgment may therefore be assessed by the success of
its outcome, as well as by the truth of its pronouncement.... It
achieves its goal only if a public moral context is established by
the judgment and the public moral context is, in some respect,
more just as a result.
In the domestic institutionalized doing of justice, we expect the
decision of a court, not just to (say) punish an offender, exact
compensation, return disputed property, or resolve a dispute, but
also, by doing any of these, to make things clearer and firmer as a
result-to remove some doubt about the rights on which one can
rely or about the limits to which one can press a claim or an action.
We expect the doing of justice to result in a situation that is more
secure-not just because this offender has been punished and
others deterred, but because certain norms that were in question
have been considered, highlighted and given effect to, in a
situation where there might otherwise have been some doubt
about whether they were to be taken seriously any longer.
§.17. In the context of just-war-making, this forward-looking
aspect of judgment helps unify what may otherwise be thought of
as separable parts of the law of armed conflict.' Responding to
aggression, for example, doesn't just involve reversing an invasion:
"prosecuting an act of judgment in armed conflict means
strengthening the conditions for justice in and among human
communities."' War looks towards peace, and peace is to- be
understood as including "all that is comprised in a stable and
settled political order, including the justice and law-governed
character of relations established within it." It may be hard to see
through to peace as normality in this sense, particularly at the
beginning of a war. From that perspective "the peace which any
conflict aims at is still indeterminate, known only negatively as the
correction of the grave injustice that afforded the cause." 8
83. Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
84. But see § 13 supra for discussion of the doubts that O'Donovan had anyway about
these separations.
85. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 62.
86. Id. at 59.
87. Id.
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Some have seen in this passage an unwarranted restriction on
O'Donovan's post bellum perspective.' This, however, is a
misunderstanding. O'Donovan describes the necessarily negative
definition of peace as the correction of injustice as a "difficulty,"
and the challenge that his concept of judgment imposes is that we
move beyond this purely negative perspective in the calculations
that inform our war-making. 89 In Ways of Judgment, O'Donovan
offers a slightly more nuanced version. He says that it is difficult
for the forward-looking impact of judgment to be anything other
than negative: as in the case of punishment, we reaffirm and
strengthen the prohibition a criminal violates.' Even there,
however, we gesture affirmatively towards the improved
conditions of life under the newly reaffirmed prohibition. He goes
on to say that "in other forms of political judgment we may point
to the conditions' of renewed life even less indirectly, as in a peace
treaty."9 But even there, he adds that our determinations are
negative: what we do explicitly is to make arrangements for a
cessation of hostilities, thereby, reaffirming the conditions of
security between the nations in question. What the life that
develops subsequently within such renewed framework cannot be
specified ex ante.93 The treaty can only "clear a space for peace" in
the affirmative sense.94
As I understand it, it is part of O'Donovan's position that no
nation is entitled to initiate hostilities unless it is prepared to take
responsibility for this forward-looking aspect and-as part of the
jus ad bellum requirement of effectiveness-unless it-is reasonable
for it to think that things can and will be improved in this regard
by the sort of action it is undertaking.
An example may help here. Late in Just War Revisited,
O'Donovan considers the use of sanctions (trade sanctions and
economic embargoes) against a country.95 Sanctions are often
thought of as an alternative to war,9' but O'Donovan views them
88. See Joseph Runzo, The Importance of Defining 'War': Terrorism, Torture,
Humanitarian Intervention and Private Military Companies, 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
139, 143 (2006).
89. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 59.
90. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 87-88.
91. Id. at 87.
92. Id. at 88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 95-108.
96. Id. at 97.
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as "acts of war which do not involve the direct use of force."'
They are rather like a siege. Considered in this light, we might ask
various questions about sanctions: for example, who bears the
impact of their imposition (usually the most vulnerable members
of the society we are targeting). One important issue is that
sanctions can simply drag on, without any anticipated end game. If
they are considered as constituting an act of judgment, that is
unsatisfactory. An act of judgment must look beyond itself to the
future and to the achieved state of greater or more secure justice
that alone can justify it. On this basis, O'Donovan insists that,
A belligerent has a duty to bring warfare to a decisive
conclusion. A besieging army may have to attempt to storm the
garrison in order to end the privation and misery within it, even
if it would suit its own purposes much better just to sit there
until there was no one left alive. Similarly, those who impose
economic sanctions must reckon with the possibility that other
action may be needed to bring their own economic siege to an
end. 98
Needless to say, it doesn't follow that one may choose any means
one likes (Hiroshima, for example) "to bring warfare to a decisive
conclusion." Nor does it mean that it is necessarily desirable to
replace sanctions with an invasion: the inconclusiveness of
sanctions and their half-hearted implementation might reveal that
no hostile action was justified against an enemy, not that invasion
is justified. 100 The point is that the end-the post bellum stage-
must be kept firmly in view in the decision to initiate hostilities of
any sort, and on O'Donovan's account, the view of the post bellum
stage that does this work must be disciplined by the prospective
aspect of judgment.
§ 18. In general, the prospective situation that armed
international judgment looks toward is a clearer and more secure
moral framework of action and interaction among the nations. "'
But it also looks to the prospects for judgment and justice within
the communities that have been at war as well. 102
97. "[E]veryone has a basic right of access to commerce with everyone else.., and a
general ban on trade with a given country, even if not illegal in law, is overtly hostile and
ought to be considered as an offence, unless it is justified 'as an act of war." Id. at 101.
98. Id. at 107-08.
99. Id. at 107.
100. Id.
101: Id. at 1-18.
102. Id.
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In § 14 this article considered O'Donovan's version of
Walzer's point that we must not wage war in a way that makes
post-bellum life in the society we are fighting impossible or
impossibly hard. The prospective aspect of judgment casts an
important light on this as well, reinforcing the connection between
jus in bello and jus post bellum:
An act of war... may be disproportionate even if it ensures
victory, and even if nothing less would have ensured victory; for
it may frustrate the very object for which conflict was joined in
the first place.
This has obvious implications for methods of fighting and types
of armament. Any mode of combat which is likely to inflict
grave damage on a society's capacity-including the enemy's
capacity-to return to a state of ordered justice falls under this
general condemnation. 103
I believe that much the same can be said about war-making
that does not look beyond the occupation of enemy territory as a
successful outcome of hostilities. An occupation of few months is
one thing, but occupation that goes on for years (as in the United
States occupation of Iraq) or decades (as in the Israeli occupation
of the West Bank after the Six Days War in 1967) leaves a territory
and a population in terrible limbo so far as "ordered justice" ' or
"a public moral context, the good order within which [people] may
act and interact as members of a community" "' are concerned.
Unless proper peacetime institutions are established and
peacetime community is secured on a reasonable basis, it is not
clear that hostilities have been brought properly to an end (again
reading "propErly" in terms of this prospective duty of justice). It
will not be surprising if the response to occupation is some sort of
insurgency which-however much its methods may be deplored-
stakes a claim that hostilities have not properly been ended and
insists on the extraordinarily unsatisfactory nature of the alleged
post bellum settlement.
We have become accustomed to thinking of r6gime change as
the telos of just war (as in the defeat of Germany and Japan in
1945, and the defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003); 10 we.have
103. But see also id. at 62 for O'Donovan's acknowledgment that it is a matter of
balance of victory for the enemy (e.g., "a Europe wholly subject to Nazism" would have
made ordered justice post bellum even worse).
104. Id.
105. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 122.
106. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 109.
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become accustomed to think of wars that end without r6gime
change in the nation of a defeated aggressor as aberrations (like
the defeat of Iraq in the First Gulf War in 1991). 107 Unconditional
surrender followed by the complete dismantling of the aggressor's
state structure and its rebuilding from scratch seems appropriate.
As far as I can tell, O'Donovan opposes this as a general approach,
though conceding it may be necessary in rare cases, as with Hitler's
Third Reich. " War looks forward at its conclusion to the
continuation (and hopefully the improvement) of ordinary
government and ordinary justice and order in the defeated
nation. ,09 As I said, that may require fresh state-building if the
aggressor regime has hopelessly compromised its domestic
institutions as the Nazis did. But in other cases, we look forward to
the continuation of the aggressor nation's ordinary political
institutions after hostilities have been brought to a satisfactory
conclusion. Certainly, those who oppose an aggressor with armed
force should take care in the course of hostilities not to make
things worse in this regard. Though they are fighting in a sense
against the aggressor government, not all aspects of governance in
the aggressor nation are fair game:
It is reasonable, perhaps, to presume a certain unity in the
operations of government; yet pictures of the wrecked
Ministries of Justice and local government in Baghdad in 1991
naturally provoked the question of what the rationale for
attacking them had been. The administration of justice and of
local government, though part of the state's operations, is not
itself a threat to any other people. "
Not only is the act of war itself to be understood as an act of
justice-looking forward to the vindication of standards of
peaceful coexistence, security, and non-aggression," but the
judgment or the doing of justice is, however, to be understood as
the central feature of peace as well, and war must not be initiated
or waged in a way that is calculated to make that impossible. 112
§ 19. When we hear the phrases "acts of judgment" and "the
doing of justice" associated with the ending of hostilities, it is
107. Id.
108. Id. at 13, 62.
109. Id. at 58-61.
110. Id. at 40.
111. Id. at 58-59.
112. Id.
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tempting to associate them with post bellum trials for war crimes
and crimes against peace and humanity. O'Donovan's account has
something to say on these topics too, but it is important to insist
that his reconceptualization of war as armed judgment is not at all
a reconceptualization of the telos of war in terms of such trials. 113
War itself is to be regarded as judgment, not just as something
paving the way for judgment. Or, if it does pave the way for
judgment, it paves the way for the ordinary aspects of
institutionalized domestic judgment that is a characteristic of a
peaceful regime.
O'Donovan tries to link the two a little bit by arguing that it is
desirable for each nation-including the defeated nation-to deal
with most low- and mid-level offenses against the laws of war
committed by its own soldiers under the auspices of their own
codes of military justice. 14 With regard to higher-level crimes, such
as crimes against peace, the situation is more complicated. The
relative success of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials is
due in part to the fact that "those trials were conducted under
conditions of occupation, in which the normal responsibilities of
government could be selectively assumed by the occupying
powers." 115 But as we saw in the previous section, occupation (and
the opportunities that it presents in this regard) should not be
thought of as the normal or normative post bellum situation. Still,
less should it be thought that the need for such trials is itself a
ground for pursuing hostilities to the level of unconditional
surrender and occupation. "It would be a disaster," writes
O'Donovan, "if the institutions of post-bellum justice created a
political pressure to fight wars d l'outrance and to refuse moderate
settlements in which each government remained intact." .16
A better model might be that of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which operated without an
occupation of Serbia or other countries whose officials were
alleged to have committed grave war crimes. "' The legality of such
113. Id. at 109-23.
114. Id. at 119; but see id. at 113. O'Donovan takes this position partly because he
believes that international law is strengthened by being incorporated into municipal codes.
115. Id. at 114.
116. Id.
117. See O'Donovan's discussion of ICTY and the similar tribunal for the Rwandan
genocide. Id. at 116.
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tribunals may be a mater of challenge. 8 But even in this case,
when we have moved beyond the unavoidable impressions of
partiality that are associated with war itself as armed judgment,
there are going to be problems about the perceived impartiality of
the tribunals:
[T]he introduction of war crimes tribunals, admirably intended
to bring a range of the gravest crimes against international law
within the scope of judicial enquiry and punishment, has had to
prove itself against a series of skeptical questions: will they
make peace-settlements more difficult to implement? can they
proceed equitably? can they establish sufficient levels of proof
to secure public confidence in their judgments? and so on.
O'Donovan sees these practical-sounding questions as going to the
heart of whether war crimes trials can be seen as legitimate acts of
judgment. 120 The situation "is not that punishing war criminals is
certainly just but only doubtfully prudent, but, rather, that if these
questions cannot be answered satisfactorily, the tribunals will be a
parody of justice.." 121
He ends the discussion of this aspect of judgment by insisting,
as his theology dictates, on its unsatisfactory and provisional
nature. "Humility is the first condition for any humane justice." 2
After some horror, we tell ourselves that we should look for
closure, for a decisive settlement, for justice that will be done in a
definitive sense.
Such a project tempts us to imagine that we can make our
justice complete, as God's judgment is complete. But how could
any judgment by any court have expressed all that needed to be
expressed about the bombing of Hiroshima, the massacre at
My-Lai, or the destruction of Dubrovnik? All that a court can
do is to set up a marker. '12
118. See James Crawford's account of the Tribunal's unsatisfactory response to some
defendants challenging the basis of its establishment under the principle of legality. Hilary
Charlesworth, Comment, 24 ADELAIDE L. REV. 13 (2003) (commenting on James
Crawford, International Law and the Rule of Law, 24 ADELAIDE L. REV. 3 (2003)).
119. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 119.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 119. For the relationship
between this humility to mercy, see O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS, supra
note 51, at 256; O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at Ch. 6.
123. O'DONOVAN, JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 123.
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Understanding war as judgment does not involve an idealization of
either: war is a terrible concatenation of terrible decisions and the
judgment that it approximates, at its best, is but a crude, informal,
and non-institutionalized version of ordinary human justice with
all its foibles, let alone the judgment we are under by God. 124 The
virtue of O'Donovan's account is that it recognizes these
limitations while nevertheless insisting that the matrix of judgment
offers the best way of understanding what there may be of justice
in the initial conduct and conclusion of war. 125
§ 20. Michael Walzer and Oliver O'Donovan in their different
ways look for connections between jus post bellum and jus in bello.
The search for connectedness is laudable, so long as it does not
have the effect of dismantling the important firewalls between
different parts of the laws and customs of armed conflict. It is
important, too-in a world where many nation-states have their
origins in conquest, occupation, the aftermath of war, or the
resolution of colonial possession-that jus post bellum should be
understood at least as much in the light of our general theory of
good governance as in light of laws relating specifically to warfare.
In circumstances where occupation continues sometimes for
decades, jus post bellum should be dominated by ordinary
principles of political rights and responsibilities, not by norms that
look for their application only in a state of "peace" consigned to
an indefinite future. Generations may come and go in a land that is
scarred by battle and under a political system that started life as a
system of military administration. Since these generations deserve
something better than the perpetual postponement of normal
political community, it is this connection between jus post bellum
and what we might call jus ordinarium that deserves our closest
consideration.
124. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 13-30; O'DONOVAN,
JUST WAR REVISITED, supra note 19, at 18-32. See also the discussion on the general
limitations of human judgment in O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51,
at 28-30.
125. O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 51, at 3-12.
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